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Thank you to Professor June Besek, and thanks to everyone here at Columbia for 
the invitation.  June, to correct one of your introductions here—Mark McKenna is 
too humble to say so, but in addition to being a widely recognized scholar, he was 
elected yesterday to the American Law Institute, which is well deserved given his 
immense contributions to Intellectual Property Law scholarship.1   
Mark and I have talked about this topic, in part in preparation for today, and so a 
lot of what I say is going to reflect some of what he has said, and I think that is fine.  
(There are worse things you can say about a scholar than, “oh, he sounds just like 
McKenna.”)  One of the things that has come up in the discussions this morning and 
on this panel—which considers the scope of the Intellectual Property right of the 
Right of Publicity, and whether it is an Intellectual Property right or not—is the 
relationship between scope and justification.  Mark’s comments suggest that there is 
no such relationship with respect to the Right of Publicity; or, that at least it is loose.  
The biggest contribution of Jennifer’s excellent book is to encourage us to think 
about the rights of publicity and the rights of privacy as different things that have—
for odd historical reasons, some of them with a purpose—been lumped together.2  
And that we ought to try to think about them more separately and their justifications 
more separately.  
When we say the scope of the right of publicity is problematic, that seems to be 
because it does not seem to have any limiting principle built into it—at least in terms 
of the positive definition of the right, as contrasted with negative limitations imposed 
in service of other policy interests such as freedom of expression.  We can flesh out 
this intuition by looking at the mechanism of justification for the right that we see in 
the cases.  If we say in any particular case, “this plaintiff ought to have the right or 
obtain the relief they are seeking against this defendant because,” the because usually 
does a lot of work.  For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, the 
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because is that the plaintiffs worked really hard on their cannonball act.3  This theory 
of labor underlies a lot of the conceptualization of the right of publicity in Intellectual 
Property terms.4  But of course, once we accept labor as the justification for 
Intellectual Property in the Right of Publicity, whenever we invoke the Right of 
Publicity in a future case the justification comes with it, even if the future case 
doesn’t have the same grounding in the moral claims of labor.  This is how the law 
evolves through precedent and common law development:  the scope of these kinds 
of rights can expand by accretion where the recognition of a right—or some aspect 
of the scope of the right in one case tethered to a particular justification present in 
that case—nevertheless adheres in future cases where that justification may not be 
present.  
If we really are looking for an understanding of what the proper scope of the Right 
of Publicity or a Right of Privacy is—if we consider them separate—it ought to be 
as a matter of positive justification, as a matter of positive definition, and it ought to 
resist this type of accretion.  We can consider some of the justifications that have 
come up.  Some of them are Intellectual Property-like and some of them are not.  The 
first Intellectual Property-like ones are typical copyright and patent justifications, 
such as Utilitarian Theory and the associated Incentive Thesis.  Notwithstanding its 
presence in Zacchini,5 utilitarian theory is not a good fit for a lot of cases, if the idea 
is that we need the right to give people an incentive to create socially valuable things 
that they would not otherwise create.  For example, it is not clear to me that the 
argument washes with respect to one’s personal identity, at least, of the type that we 
would see protected in the more privacy-oriented cases.  And so, keeping those kinds 
of justifications distinct—and tied to the factual predicates of the cases in which they 
are asserted—might do some work.  
The second type of justification is a trademark theory—the False Endorsement 
theory that Mark identified as a matter of federal law under The Lanham Act, 
§ 43(a)6—which makes sense in False Endorsement cases.  But again, not all Right 
of Publicity cases are False Endorsement cases.  Zacchini, for example, is not a false 
endorsement case, nor are most of the privacy-based cases that Jennifer identifies as 
the historical source of the modern right of publicity.7  Moreover, it is not clear—to 
the extent that the False Endorsement theory is premised as a kind of trademark 
theory—that it holds up on its own terms.  One case that I recall—a district court 
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case from a few years ago, Amazon vs. Cannondale,8 involved a False Endorsement 
theory about a celebrity athlete appearing in a catalog without her permission.  The 
court twisted itself around to say that the plaintiff had a trademark in her identity, but 
that the good with which the mark was associated was also her identity.9  When we 
try to justify the right of publicity by analogizing to other areas of Intellectual 
Property, we do not necessarily end up in a place that we can coherently defend.  
The third type of justification I want to talk about is the Privacy justification.  
There are a lot of people here more expert than I.  Jennifer is obviously one of them.  
Danielle Citron, who we will be hearing from this afternoon, is one of them.10  And 
the interaction between privacy interests and First Amendment interests is important 
and worth talking about and something I do not want to say much about as a 
substantive matter.  I will though say that it is the kind of justification that is 
irreducibly normative in a way that economic justifications tend not to be.  That is to 
say, when we are talking about what we are entitled to as a matter of our privacy, we 
are talking about what we have a right to expect of one another as human beings, 
who have to live together in society, and who ought to treat one another in ways that 
we would want to be treated ourselves.  There are obviously lots of different views 
on those normative issues, and implementing those views as a matter of positive law 
is complicated and, I think, a democratic challenge. 
But we can draw some inferences from that task for the scope of the right of 
publicity—again, the subject of this panel.  Some specifications of one’s privacy 
interests might be consistent, for example, with expansion of a privacy right after the 
death of the individual identified—to the extent that it is the kind of thing that we 
would expect for our fellow human beings to do for us even after we are gone.  A 
notion of our obligations with respect to the privacy of the dead might indicate that 
the scope of a post-mortem right of publicity ought to be tailored to that particular 
set of obligations.  For example, it might be the kind of right that can only descend 
to particular people who we think are very closely identified with the protection of 
that privacy interest.  Or, it might be the kind of right that could be exercised as a 
right to exclude, but not a right to alienate, or not a right to include, precisely because 
once you can alienate it, or waive it in some context but not in others, it drives those 
exercising the right into a market, which takes us into the economic area that we 
typically associate with the right of publicity rather than privacy.  
The final justification that we hear talked about quite a bit is the one I began with: 
the economic interest that derives from one’s labor.  If we are going to try and tie 
rights, in particular economic rights, to labor, I think we face a number of challenges.  
This is a challenge that we see in other intellectual property contexts as well.  If we 
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think that intellectual property rights attach by virtue of the moral claims of labor, 
we instantly run into the problem of scope.  What is my labor worth, exactly?  And 
why is what my labor is worth something that gives me a legal right to prevent you 
from accessing something that you want to access?  Or doing something that you 
want to do?  This is the question of proportionality, which is a deep complication of 
Lockean labor theories most famously illustrated by Robert Nozick in the example 
that he gave of pouring a can of tomato juice into the ocean.11  When you mix your 
labor with the ocean, does that mean that you are entitled to the ocean?  Clearly not.   
In the context that we are talking about, where we have performers whose labor 
might be exploited by someone else without permission, the proportionality question 
is this:  in what context is the performer’s labor being exploited, and to what extent 
is the exploitation something that derives value from the performer’s labor, as 
opposed to from the exploiter and their labor?  Here, I think of Comedy III Partners 
v. Saderup, where a lifelike but skilled representation of the Three Stooges was put 
on merchandise by the defendant after the Three Stooges death.12  There are 
justifications in that case of an intellectual property right premised on the labor of 
the people whose only labor was having existed, at least with respect to the t-shirts 
and things that the defendant was selling. 
Where we are dealing with claims that derive from labor—and I think the clearest 
present-day example is the digital replicas of actors such as Peter Cushing in Star 
Wars and so forth13—we run into these questions of proportionality and an inevitable 
slippery slope.  In the digital replicas scenario, the most pressing danger is not that 
my labor will be taken without my permission.  Rather, it is that my labor will 
become obsolete.  It is that you will no longer need an actor when you can have a 
digital replica doing the same thing.  If that is something that concerns us, then I 
think we need a substantive justification that is far deeper than “I worked hard for 
this.”  We need some justification that addresses how our connection to our labor 
relates to how we expect to be treated as human beings.  That claim is analogous to 
the privacy interests that underlie the historical claims I discussed earlier.  It is, as I 
said in that context, primarily a democratic, normative, and political challenge. 
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